Survival and 4GW - Tactics and Strategies for a Global War
Understanding Iraq/Saudi War- Insurgency as 4GW, by Jacques Dessalines
The Wars We Live: Beyond Iraq Strategies - Insurgency and 4GW
True Comprehension of The Grand Strategies of the Key Players -- and the Forces They Represent -- is nowhere to be found... There are many secrets... and plans that only a select few on each of the many sides have privy to.
Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms
The ruling class employs three phases of escalation to control power and its uses:
Fake liberal democracy; sophisticated riot control and subversion of opposition groups; faked national crises leading to martial law and civil war.
This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grand or the priority strategies of either side -- amid this confusion of goals -- is no easy task.
This paper considers the third phase of struggle against the ruling class:
Guerrilla insurgencies employing Fourth generation Warfare (4GW) on the battlefield, the streets and the media: To build or disrupt alliances and to destroy the cohesion of the West and create doubt. (I.1)
The measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies and weapon systems. A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. (I.2.)
See full article and introduction with a comment on the Massive US base
at Diego Garcia: Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058642.html
Rifleman Democracy (plus INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES OF CONTROL & AGGRESSION; long w/footnotes plus ); http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/05/good-defense-anticipates-enemy-offense.html
Section II.
U.S. National Defense Review: Adaptation to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)
.....Between advance and retreat. Hidden dragon. Do not act.
--I Ching
Consider the problem of conflict in a wide scope and the essential, but limited, role of military force in resolving conflict. What makes a force effective? -- The answers are largely independent of the particular age in which one dwells and the specific weapons one uses. In China, Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.) emphasized harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. Such a strategy reduced the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics... to win without fighting. (II.1.)
John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- (OODA) pattern to operate inside his opponent's decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To sustain high operational tempos he codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army. (II.2.)
The US military has completed recommendations on how to change personnel management systems to foster Boyd's organizational climate. Boyd's formula of -- people--ideas --hardware, in that order, holds as well for warring states on the plains of ancient China as for guerilla warfare or national missile defense today. Though force restructuring is underway at the Pentagon, much of it would not meet with the approval (at least on a cost efficiency basis) of 4GW experts. (II.3.)
There are 3 fundamental points in Chester W. Richards' review of Boyd and Sun Tzu:
1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.
2. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware, however, a hypothetical force including a hardware component can be compared to planned U.S. forces as expounded by Sun Tzu and John Boyd
3. Richards' outlines such a military force, one that is more effective and requires fewer resources than what the US has today. (II.4))
Richards suggests deactivating from the U.S. Army Corps, that part of its forces which are unlikely to reach a theater of conflict while any modern war is still going on. The Marine Corps and those units of the Army generally called -- unconventional-- would remain. Properly supported, this provides a mobile striking force that could descend on any part of the globe and strike at the heart of an enemy nation.
Summary of the US 3-4 GW Evolutionary Strike Force:
A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[ And- for insurgents - to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy -- especially among the leaders of US strike forces ]
B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.
[ Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare (II.5.) ]
C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:
U.S. Marine Corps, Army 82nd Airborne Division, Special Forces, Rangers, Delta Force, SEALs and other unconventional forces, carrier and land-based tactical air, and Intra-theater lift of heavy armor & mechanized infantry. These would be enhanced through: Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation; and increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations. (II.6.)
The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won.
Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions as the ruling class. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US -- though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast! (II.7.)
See complete article at: Section II. National Defense Review --
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us-national-defense-review.html
With Photo Gallery at: Section II. National Defense Review
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000380294&zorpiasid=6c3126873f1df1f1af3dfc56134f5cde
Section III.
Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
The Tao Te Ching (c. 500 B.C.), states that, "Weapons are the tools of fear. A decent man will avoid them, except in the direst necessity." Some argue that we have now swung to the opposite extreme... or the direst emergency.
The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun's goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), but, as Griffith notes, -- the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. His primary tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of a panoply of tools, such as deception, security, and intelligence.
The final chapter of The Art of War deals with use of spies. Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishment. Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation. It must be obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the enemy. (III.2.)
John Boyd arrived at similar conclusions. In "Blitzkrieg: Keys to Success," the third point is:
Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and during combat operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. Boyd's OODA Loop Sketch shows that he regarded intelligence in the broadest sense no less highly than Sun Tzu. He emphasizes the importance of open systems, and the only opening into the OODA loop is through Observation. If one fails to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become "mentally isolated." If adversaries can keep us in this state -- operating inside our OODA loops -- then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc. (III.3.) A competent enemy will create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts or, as Boyd put it, "phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change." This explains why ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander wants them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible. (III.4.)
Although Sun Tzu is known for his admonition "To win without fighting is best," the subject of this sentence and of The Art of War is: To win. Whether used to fight or for some other purpose, Sun Tzu placed a high premium on the utility of military force. (III.5.)
See: Section III. Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18601
Section IV. Threats to U.S. National Security
The most likely cause for introducing US military forces would be a large-scale attack against a country that the U.S. considers a "vital national interest" (Israel, Taiwan. Saudi Arabia). U.S. forces could face anything from a conventional attack to what is called "fourth generation warfare" (4GW). This term describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks -- and others that will evolve. (IV.1)
Grant Hammond of the Air War College notes (IV.2.), 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name: Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view ... a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible. In 4GW distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 aircraft by poisoning the squadron's mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. 4GW, while highly "asymmetric," is not the same as "asymmetric warfare," since maneuver warfare is also "asymmetric" and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly. Since 2001, more than 50 major active conflicts are brewing, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of US troops. Survival of the US does not have to be the issue; survival of the current political leadership will suffice. (IV.3.)
See full article at: Section IV. Threats to U.S. National Security
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058691.html
http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournal?moduleId=31058
Section V. Sun Tzu and Boyd on the Utility of Military Force
For Sun Tzu the best way to defeat an enemy is by "attacking his strategy." Attack early, while the enemy's plans are being laid or employ unusual methods to "seize victory without even battling." Should this prove impossible, Sun Tzu then recommends disrupting his alliances. Some say that this means to attack early, before the enemy can solidify his alliances. Others suggest it means isolating potential enemies from sources of support, or intimidating them through strong alliances of your own. (V.1.)
The use of armed force by the US government must be carefully thought out so that it does not cause more problems than it solves. (V.2.) For this Boyd expands on Sun Tzu's first two courses of action through his concept of "grand strategy," which serves to:
1. Support national goals
2. Pump up one's own resolve, drain away the adversary's resolve, and attract the uncommitted to one's cause
3. End the conflict on favorable terms
4. Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict
For insurgents, more and bloodier is usually a desired accomplishment (V.3.)
The goal of war, once unleashed, is to achieve victory:
1. In the shortest possible time
2. At the least possible cost in lives and effort to one's own side
3. With the infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties
Today, one finds many justifications for U.S. military force, all of which can be included within three broad categories: 1. Defend homeland from attack; 2. Enforce "Pax Americana" ; 3. Protect vital U.S. interests abroad. (V.4.)
Enforcing worldwide peace is a large job. Many of the 40 major armed conflicts active in the world involve longstanding ethnic or tribal disputes. It is not clear how entry of U.S. armed forces would resolve them. This suggests a policy of selective intervention, which is usually phrased as "protecting U.S. vital interests." As with the Pax Americana, most Americans agree with the idea that the US should employ its armed forces to protect vital interests. U.S. leaders will commit enormous forces to protect such things as access to crude oil, and given the dependence of the U.S. economy on imported resources, practically any part of the world could become a "vital national interest" in the future (Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia). (V.5.)
See: Section V. Sun Tzu and Boyd on the Utility of Military Force
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/059016.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18817
Section VI. Military Force vis-a-vis Other Options and Considerations
The Balkans, Chechnya, East Timor, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq have shown the limited capacity of the major powers to deploy forces relevant to keeping the peace and rebuilding states shattered by civil war. Civil affairs capabilities have proven to be almost non existent. Keeping the peace requires soldiers to act like policemen, a job for which they are ill prepared and ill equipped. Many Third World countries resent the U.S. ready resort to military power. (VI.1.)
Since the Bush invasion of Iraq, large majorities around the world have grown to fear the threat of an Imperial-Crusader US foreign policy and the US proclaimed right to pre-emptive strikes, lies and bullying that it uses to get its way with the people of the Middle East, US allies and the UN. The U.S. is rushing to court unpopularity across the world, contrary to expectations that the Bush national security establishment would conduct itself with sophistication. There is little sign of the maturity, balance and sobriety expected of the -- reluctant warrior -- Colin Powell ... The U.S. policy in the first months of President George Bush was suggestive of a lack of coherence and a hegemonic arrogance. The Bush administration set a record for alienating so many nations in such a short period. And then there was Iraq... (VI.2.)
Forgotten are the lesson of the Tao Te Ching, that any use of "power," even (especially) if it is successful, breeds resentment and may plant the seeds of future conflict. (VI.3.) Boyd, Chester and most liberals miss the point of Bush's actions. Having grasped the seriousness of Boyd's predictions about 4GW, the US has been forced to accelerate its program of global domination. Though some mistakes were made -- as in all conflicts -- Bush seeks to draw out potential large nation enemies so that the US can destroy their conventional forces and reduce their support to insurgents. Then the US will only face 4GW and strategic threats of a diminished nature. (VI.4.)
Boyd and Sun Tzu insisted that to be effective, the military option must be integrated within the entire collection of tools available. The US is assembling a national military plan that will provide effective forces when called for, but which does not require accurate predictions of the future. Sun Tzu and John Boyd provide a resolution to this dilemma by stepping up one level and asking, "Regardless of the specifics of how they will be used, what makes military forces effective in general?" If the US creates an evolutionary military force, and equips and trains them for maneuver conflict and 4GW, then operating in conjunction with allies and using the other tools for advancing vital interests, it can field an effective and affordable military force.
Peacekeeping: In the initial stages of a peacekeeping operation, military forces may be needed to engage hostile military forces before true peacekeeping can begin. This is a standard use of force and presents no conceptual problems, since the primary mission of the military is to defeat opposing armed forces by death and destruction if necessary. This is what they study, equip, and train for. People are promoted (or should be) for their proficiency as war fighters and leaders. In true peacekeeping, the mission is protection, not destruction. It is more akin to policing than to soldiering, and uses of force must be controlled. One of the largest threats to effective peacekeeping is the orientation that the underlying problems can be solved by force. This mindset can be reinforced if it seems that armed military groups cannot be quickly eliminated or, as in Somalia, that they keep reappearing after a successful initial stage. Such a situation could indicate that the armed groups enjoy wider support among the population than originally thought -- that U.S. forces are engaging in fourth generation warfare without knowing it -- and so the venue is not ready for "peacekeeping" at all. (VI.5.)
See: Section VI. Military Force vis-a-vis Other Options and Considerations
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=19094
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18818