Part XIII to XV. Newest Version w/Notes
Section XIII. Force Structure Options
Summary of the guidelines for a Sun Tzu / Boyd force:
1. Military force is a key component of furthering national interests, but it is not the only component or in many cases even the primary one. It should always be used sparingly.
2. Military forces, when they are used, should obey Sun Tzu's dictum: end the conflict in the quickest possible time with the least possible damage to either side.
3. Military operations against conventional forces, for example, to assist an ally under conventional attack, must be conducted as maneuver warfare. That implies a substantial capacity to play the cheng / chi game against any potential opponent.
4. Military operations in 4GW must be carefully measured so that, by their very success, they do not strengthen the hands of opponents. It truly is not necessary to destroy the village in order to save it. (XIII.1.)
The changing nature of Maneuver Warfare requirements suggest:
1. Increased focus on littorals (regions within a hundred miles of the sea), where most of the world's people, wealth, commerce, instabilities, and U.S. interests are concentrated.
2. Decreased need for large standing land and air forces, and an enhanced role for reserve forces.
3. Decreased need for heavy naval forces configured for global war at sea and heavy bombing forces, with a concurrent shift to maintaining control of littoral regions in support of interventions.
4. The need for intervention and extraction capabilities to protect lives, property, commerce, and other interests, with an emphasis on high-speed lighter forces configured for autonomous operations in hostile regions.
5. The rise of fourth-generation warfare, resulting in an increased need for irregular war-fighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small-unit operations among state/non-state actors. Characteristic of this are the following:
a. Decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground warfare.
b. Decreased reliance on deep-strike/interdiction/strategic bombardment of "infrastructure" in air warfare.
c. Increased reliance on fast-transient littoral penetration operations, info-war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/ antiterrorist/ antinuclear operations, and increased occurrences of urban/suburban combat.
d. Increased resource constraints resulting in internal competition for resources. (XIII.3)
See full article at: Section XIII. Force Structure Options
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Section XIV. Evolving US Strike Forces and Rapid Deployment Options
The U.S. Marine Corps provides all the conventional ground warfare capability needed to engage the land forces of any Third World country. The three active duty U.S.M.C. divisions provide a range of capabilities, including heavy armor, light armored vehicles, organic artillery, air support and infantry. The Marine Corps, beginning with its 1989 edition of Warfighting, is the farthest along in adopting maneuver warfare concepts. Using them, the Marines liberated Kuwait in two days and probably could have done it as early as the end of September 1990. Once the rout began, there was nothing to stop a Patton-esque penetration -- properly supported from the air (as Patton's was) and logistically (as Patton's was not) -- from continuing straight on to Baghdad. The big hook around the left flank was at best cheng, perhaps unnecessary, and in any case, failed to accomplish its stated objective, since the bulk of the capable Iraqi forces escaped over the Euphrates. (XIV.1.)
The US can simplify its defense establishment by eliminating active Army armor and mechanized infantry divisions, and their supporting units, higher headquarters, commands, the Department of the Army, etc. A certain amount of additional heavy capability can be maintained in the Guard and Reserve, and exercised frequently with the legacy U.S.M.C. conventional components. Transferring these missions to the Guard and Reserve could actually increase their effectiveness in the rare cases when additional heavy combat capability is needed. Active Army -- unconventional forces, including Ranger, Special Forces, and Airborne units, will be retained, which have the unique capability among Army units of actually being able to reach the fight while it is still going on. In addition to being major players in 4GW, they can participate in cheng / chi combinations against both the conventional and unconventional forces of Third World armies. The idea would be to combine them with the Marine Corps into a new Strike Force. It is not that these unconventional forces will be the chi to the Marines' cheng. Enemies would react to that pattern and exploit it. It is that combining these two elements provides a wider range of options for commanders. This force should provide the requisite variety for carrying out cheng / chi operations against any threat it is likely to face on the ground in the next 15 years. (XIV.3.)
Strategic and Mobility Forces
The Air Force's mission would become purely strategic. Strategic delivery systems, including submarines and unconventional methods, would belong to this force, as would any eventual strategic defensive systems. Combat missions in space would also belong to this new force. Tactical aircraft from the Air Force and the Navy would be transferred to the Strike Force. Intra-theater, or tactical transport by whatever means, including C-130, helicopter, or ground, would belong to the Strike Force, which would have to determine the balance between transport by air and by other means in the vicinity of operations on land. Inter-theater transport aircraft, such as the C-5 and C-17, would be transferred to the Navy/Mobility Force, whose mission would become to move and support the Strike Force anywhere in the world. (XIV.5)
See: Section XIV. Evolving US Strike Forces and Rapid Deployment Options
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Section XV. Fire Support and Weapons Requirements (Part I of II)
Before World War II, aerial bombardment was regarded as an instrument of mass terror; its targets were cities and the people and infrastructure within them. Then the doctrine of daylight precision bombardment was developed where the objective was to destroy key elements of an enemy's war-supporting industrial base so as to render continued military operations impossible. The Gulf War was the first time that precision guided munitions (PGMs) were used on a large scale. This trend accelerated in Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force (Bosnia and Kosovo). Targets included buildings in urban areas, small groups of soldiers within villages, and individual vehicles within convoys. The same sorts of targets have been prominent in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. There, U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. (XV.2.)The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead and coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laser homing guidance.
Similar capabilities have been demonstrated in Iraq (2003-2004). However, the shock-and-awe initial attacks were not particularly effective and the US has failed to kill a single Iraqi leader with bombs as of June 2004. Weapons or technology without solid intelligence to guide them are dangerous and of marginal tactical or strategic value. (XV.3.)
LOCATING & ATTACKING TERRORISTS & RELATED TARGETS
Improvements are being developed so that U.S. air forces can identify and attack small groups of people with appropriate levels of confidence that innocent civilians will not be placed at undue risk. Opportunities exist to define new and more effective concepts of execution (CONEXs) for engaging such targets. Terrorists will try to operate in areas and ways that make them difficult to find, identify, and isolate. They may be in wilderness areas that feature mountains, caves, forest, or jungle canopy. They may be living in rural areas, using anonymous-looking dwellings or small encampments, or they may choose urban environments (again occupying unexceptional buildings). Within these environments, terrorists may be stationary or moving, with movement being by vehicle or on foot. In all cases, the terrorists may be in the company of noncombatant (family members or unrelated strangers). New concepts for engaging such a demanding target set will seek to incorporate innovations among "finders, controllers, and shooters." (XV.4.)
Fire Support for the New US Strike Forces
In order to make the land forces more effective, particularly when engaged against conventional opponents, it is necessary to ensure adequate fire support. In keeping with an increased focus on the littorals, one way to provide this is to recommission battleships and modernize their main armament and fire control systems. The battleship provides an invincible platform for delivering effective fire support in the littorals, 16-inch rounds being difficult to counter. The psychological effect of these behemoths, which unlike aircraft carriers can safely steam close enough to shore to be seen, heard, and felt by the inhabitants, is a capability worth keeping. Since they get everybody's attention, they personify cheng. Paint giant American flags on the side.
U.S. forces can apply firepower precisely when and where it is needed. The AC- 130 gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions today, since it combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. The crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. In addition, airpower in the form of tactical airlift and fire support has proven attractive in these situations because it can bring forces and firepower to bear on the enemy without having to move heavy equipment, such as trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery, over land. Airpower obviates the need to rely upon often primitive ground-transportation infrastructures. It also increases the possibility of gaining tactical surprise by limiting the enemy's ability to observe preparations for an attack. (XV.5.)
In the Iraqi battles around Falluja, Najaf, Karbala and Sadr City (April - May 2004) the US used AC-130s with powerful and deadly results - the accuracy is not known, but many people were killed.
One can also envisage situations in which U.S. involvement in counterterrorist operations is desired but one or both sides would like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. The Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind "fingerprints" associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes. Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged. (XV.7.)
To cause larger enemy formations to stop moving and to engage land forces ashore, a US strike force needs an effective close air support and air interdiction capability. This would facilitate maneuver warfare in littoral areas outside the battleship range, and it could also provide fire support and interdiction in conjunction with unconventional forces operating much deeper -- perhaps in a thrust / feint towards the capital or ruling juntas residences, weapons of mass destruction storage / launch facilities, etc. In order to support high operational tempos and interfere with the enemy's, an aircraft must be developed capable of operating from carriers, as well as far forward from austere bases (and generating high sortie rates). Such considerations suggest a short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft with system redundancy, a low vulnerable area, low visible signatures, and high loiter capability. Particular attention should be paid to allowing it to operate successfully in an environment infested with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS -- shoulder-fired infra-red missiles), of which there are upwards of 500,000 in the world today (accounting for 2/3 of all aircraft destroyed by ground fire in the last 15 years). This implies a low infra-red signature (less than one-tenth that of an F-16, which is itself some 35 times that of an AH-64 Apache helicopter). It should be designed to rain enough chaos from the sky to cause Third World troops to rapidly leave their vehicles and not return for an appreciable time. (XV.8.)
The Marines have the AV-8B Harrier, but it is expensive, complex, and vulnerable to ground fire. U.S.A.F. studies in the1980s demonstrated the feasibility of developing a simpler and more rugged aircraft. Armed helicopters would largely be retired, since they were developed because the Army was not allowed to have fixed-wing combat aircraft. They are slow, vulnerable to ground threats, and require logistics out of proportion to their effectiveness, as was demonstrated by Task Force Hawk in Albania and in Iraq engagements. On March 23, 60 miles south of Baghdad the US sent dozens of Apaches into a heavily fortified area defended by elite Republican Guards. Many of the Apache helicopters were damaged.
Since the new US strike force will depend on maneuver warfare, there is a need to ensure that enemies cannot use their own air forces to significantly inhibit the ability of U.S. forces to maneuver. This implies at least local air superiority and a robust organic air defense capability. American fighter pilots, flying continually improved versions of current air-to-air platforms -- the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 -- are more than capable of engaging any conceivable enemy air forces and keeping them away from on-shore troops. They can operate in conjunction with cruise missile and unconventional attacks against enemy air bases. The force should retain a small number, perhaps 6, modern aircraft carriers (CVNs) to provide protection from enemy air forces until bases can be established ashore and for operating the more vulnerable intelligence, electronic warfare, and command-and-control platforms. It also should keep a robust research and development program in this area, including MANPADS and other highly mobile, logistically simple means of air defense and improvements to our air-to-air fighters. (XV.9.)
OspreyCV-22
With a range of 515 miles and capable of transporting 24 troops plus the two man crew (at 275 knots), the V22 is set to play an important role in transporting Special Forces. The vertical takeoff plane can carry a 10,000-pound payload 50 nautical miles at 3,000 feet. During the previous OPEVAL (operations evaluation tests), 24 combat loaded Marines were flown in the MV-22. Ingress and egress were demonstrated without difficulty. The Air Force requires the CV-22 to provide a long-range VTOL insertion and extraction capability and to supplement the Special Operations Forces (SOF) MC-130 aircraft in precision engagement." The V-22 is also being developed to perform Marine Corps (USMC), Navy(USN), and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) combat missions. The V-22 design, incorporating advanced but mature technology, takes advantage of proven technology in composite materials, digital fly-by-wire flight controls, and advanced survivability and crashworthiness. A tiltrotor combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft represents a major technological breakthrough in aviation that meets long standing military needs.
AV-8B Harrier (The Marines' Jump-Jet)
The AV-8B V/STOL strike aircraft was designed to replace the AV-8A and the A-4M light attack aircraft. Combining tactical mobility, responsiveness, reduced operating cost and basing flexibility, both afloat and ashore, V/STOL aircraft are particularly well-suited to special combat and expeditionary requirements. The AV-8BII+ features the APG-65 Radar common to the F/A-18, as well as all previous systems and features common to the AV-8BII. B. In Operation Desert Storm (1991) the Harriers were highlighted by expeditionary air operations and they were the first Marine Corps tactical strike platform to arrive in theater. Three squadrons, totaling 60 aircraft, and one six-aircraft detachment operated ashore from an expeditionary airfield, while one squadron of 20 aircraft operated from a sea platform. During the ground war, AV-8Bs were based as close as 40 from the Kuwait border, making them the most forward deployed tactical strike aircraft. The AV-8B flew 3,380 sorties for a total of 4,083 flight hours while maintaining a mission capable rate in excess of 90%. Average turnaround time during the ground war surge rate flight operations was 23 minutes. (
Despite assertions by the Marine Corps that its crash-plagued AV-8B Harrier attack jet is safe, House Armed Services Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-El Cajon) said he would appoint Rep. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (R-Santa Clarita) to lead a task force to assess persistent safety problems. The Harrier has long been the military's most dangerous plane. Forty-five Marines have died in 148 noncombat accidents in the 32-year history of the single-seat jet. More than one-third of the fleet has been destroyed in crashes.
Increased accident tallies reflects a broader trend: the rate of Class A, accidents for all military aircraft jumped by about one-third in 2002 and 2003, to about two per 100,000 flight hours. A Class A accident is one that results in death or permanent injury or causes damage of more than $1 million. In the Air Force alone, accidents in the last decade killed more than 300 aviators, destroyed more than 250 aircraft and cost $11 billion. Human factors - mistakes by pilots, mechanics and aircrew - cause the vast majority of accidents. Such errors contributed to 83% of the Navy's serious accidents, while equipment or material failure contributed to 36%.
In contrast, the safety chiefs agreed, the aging of the military fleets does not pose a significant safety concern. Christopher Bolkcom, a military aviation analyst with the Congressional Research Service, testified that, "leadership is the single most important factor in increasing safety." He noted that the number of staff with expertise and responsibility for aviation safety in the office of the Secretary of Defense had been cut in recent years from eight to none. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld challenged the services last year to reduce by half in the next two years the number and rate of accidents.
Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) asked Helland why the Marines' major accident rate was twice that of other services. Helland responded that the Marine Corps flies predominantly combat aircraft, not transports. Naval Safety Center records show the AV-8B's accident rate has vacillated but has not declined for any extended period since its inception in the mid-1980s. Its Class A accident rate in 2003 was 11.05 per 100,000 hours - more than five times the average rate for all military aircraft. The AV-8B losses in 2003 totaled $154 million.
The causes of the five 2003 crashes remain under investigation. Helland said one involved "some sort of an anomaly in the aircraft"; in another, the engine may have been damaged by a foreign object. A third Harrier, he said, ran off the tarmac in Afghanistan in a strong crosswind. Harriers flew 1,686 missions in Afghanistan, 58% of them at night, and 2,186 missions in Iraq. None were shot down. One crashed in Afghanistan and one in the Persian Gulf. The AV-8B is scheduled to fly for another decade until its successor, the Marines' version of the Joint Strike Fighter, becomes available. The AV-8B production line was closed last year. (XV.11.)
See complete article at: Section XV. Fire Support and Weapons Requirements (Part I of II)
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Section XVI. Weapons From RPGs to Mini and Neutron Nukes
(Part II of Fire Support and Weapons Requirements)
Below is god on 4GW - http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/4gw_continued.htm
below is good quotes by G. Sunborough on mercenary death squads in Iraq and S America -- Carlyle and UK --http://beirut.indymedia.org/ar/2004/06/1454.shtml
also gary S. -- http://beirut.indymedia.org/ar//2004/05/1255.shtml