Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
VIII. Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
Although the strategies of Boyd and Sun Tzu may seem complicated, with numerous lists and in Boyd’s case, hours of briefing slides, much of this, including practically all of Sun Tzu, provides guidance for employing forces and only indirectly affects their creation. At the beginning of “Patterns of Conflict,” Boyd suggests four elements that would enable a force to function effectively in maneuver conflict and 4GW. Two of these are external and two internal:
It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish an adversary’s capacity for independent action.
The simpler organisms – those that make up man as well as man working together with other men in a higher level context – must cooperate or, better yet, harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic synthesis. To shape and adapt to change, one cannot be passive; instead one must take the initiative.
A look back at Boyd’s “organizational scheme” on p. 27 illustrates one way to satisfy these four criteria. Organic structures in general and military forces in particular that possess these qualities gain great competitive advantage: they can operate with quick/inconspicuous/irregular OODA loops, they can play the cheng / ch’i game, and they can generally shape the course of the conflict, responding as necessary to moves by their thinking human opponent. Chester applies these four qualities, along with the other insights of Boyd and Sun Tzu, to the (re-)creation of U.S. military forces (people, ideas, and hardware).
In creating forces and assessing them, one needs to ask:
1. Do they offer the requisite variety? Do they present a wide range of options to the people actually conducting the conflict? Do they facilitate the creation of cheng / ch’i situations? As noted above, Boyd placed a premium on selecting the option that would be least expected by the enemy, not necessarily the one that is predicted to be the most effective, and a wide variety of options from which to select is a prerequisite.
2. Can commanders rapidly shift the focus if required? When a decision is made, are forces structured and trained so that it can be rapidly carried out? Is this capability being tested and exercised under a variety of circumstances? When selecting between quickness and predicted effectiveness, is there a strong bias towards quickness?
3. Are people and forces being trained to act in harmony? Are organizations formed to foster harmony? Is this quality exercised in a variety of circumstances and are those who prove adept in its employment promoted?
4. What is being done to ensure that people at all levels will take the initiative in harmony with others in the force to achieve objectives? In particular, are all commanders trained to issue mission orders?
Although effectiveness on the battlefield depends on people, ideas, and hardware in that order, when creating forces there can be advantages to starting with ideas. There are instances where superbly trained and led troops have been defeated because of flawed doctrine. The bloody and indecisive battles of World War I immediately come to mind. But more important, different ideas, strategies, and doctrines make different demands on people. They answer the question, “training to do what?” for example. So although people will predominate once in combat, this analysis begins with the ideas element of Boyd’s trinity.
Instead of detailed tactics, followers of Sun Tzu evolved what might be called a way of thinking about conflict. This paper has previously noted its applicability to guerilla warfare by Mao Tse Tung. That guerillas should be using Sun Tzu is not surprising, given his emphasis on deception and formlessness, since guerillas that become predictable are quickly eliminated. As the world moves into the 21st Century, such forms of highly irregular and unpredictable conflict are becoming the only way for many opponents to confront U.S. military forces. The prediction is that 4GW which is in a sense “asymmetric” conflict pushed to its limits, is what the U.S. military will have to face in the future.
4GW is nothing especially new and may represent the oldest form of organized conflict between groups of humans. Sun Tzu has been recommending asymmetric conflict for 2,500 years, although he did not draw any distinction between what today would be called highly irregular, 4GW and any other type. When applied to large-scale “conventional” conflict, that is, where both sides have large forces and roughly equal levels of technology, the result is often known as “maneuver warfare” or “third generation warfare.”